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ABSTRACT
Three chimpanzees with a history of conditional and numeric token training spontaneously matched
relations between relations under conditions of nondifferential reinforcement. Heretofore, this conceptual
ability was demonstrated only in language-trained chimpanzees. The performance levels of the languagenaive animals in this study, however, were equivalent to those of a 4th animal—Sarah—whose history
included language training and analogical problem solving. There was no evidence that associative
factors mediated successful performance in any of the animals. Prior claims of a profound disparity
between language-trained and language-naive chimpanzees apparently can be attributed to prior
experience with arbitrary tokens consistently associated with abstract relations and not language per se.

Early reports by some investigators indicated that language-trained chimpanzees differed profoundly in
their problem-solving skills from chimpanzees who had not had such training (D. Premack, 1983a, 1983b,
1984, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). Language-trained chimpanzees solved conceptual problems that
language-naive chimpanzees failed. D. Premack's language-trained animals, for example, reportedly
were superior to the language-naïve animals on problems that required reasoning about relations
between relations but that could not be solved merely on the basis of correspondence of physical
features.
The discrepancy between language-trained and language-naïve chimpanzees reported by D. Premack
was based originally on the performances of seven African-born chimpanzees raised from infancy by
human caregivers; three of the seven had received language training and four had not. Premack argued
that the disparity in performance between these two groups of animals on such tasks could not be
attributed to either age differences or their relative test sophistication (cf. D. Premack, 1984). Rather this
profound disparity could be attributed only to whether or not an animal had received language training as
originally described by D. Premack (1976). Short strings of rule-governed plastic words formed the
physical basis of this language, which the chimpanzees used in both comprehension and production. See

D. Premack and Premack (1994) for a summary of the procedure and D. Premack (1976) and A. J.
Premack and Premack (1972) for extended examples.
One such task that differentiated between language-trained and language-naive chimpanzees in D.
Premack's research program was a modified version of an analogy problem called conceptual matchingto-sample. Given AA as sample, for example, the correct response is to choose a BB rather than an EF
alternative. Given CD as sample, the correct alternative is EF and not BB. Each letter within a pair refers
here, and throughout this article, to a discrete object. Hence, an AA sample might consist of a pair of
physically identical cups and BB to a pair of identical shoes. CD and EF might refer to pairs of
nonidentical objects consisting, respectively, of a bottle top paired with a clothespin and a pen paired with
a padlock.
Because the individual objects used to construct the sample and alternatives are physically different,
successful matching cannot be based on the correspondence of physical features. Instead, successful
performance of a conceptual matching problem must be based on the correspondence of two abstract
relations. In this case, an animal is required to judge one pair of identical objects as instantiating the
same within-pair relationship as another pair of identical objects. Likewise, the animal has to judge one
pair of nonidentical objects as instantiating the same within-pair relationship as another pair of
nonidentical objects (see Thompson & Oden, 1996).
It is clear from D. Premack's early discussions (1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1986) that he considered prior
practice with linguistic strings per se as necessary if a chimpanzee were to master conceptual relational
matching and related tasks. In his later writings, D. Premack (1988, 1992) indicated that, although some
aspects of language training with discursive sequences of symbols were sufficient, none was a necessary
prerequisite for at least some minimal competence level in judging relations. For example, D. Premack
asserted that a procedure he labeled "dogged training" alone could enable a language-naive chimpanzee
to match like proportions of different objects (e.g., ¼ apple = ¼ glass of water; see D. Premack, 1988, p.
54). We assume that "dogged training" in this setting meant persistent training involving very many trials,
perhaps thousands, on a single problem using differential reinforcement; if so, then the description is apt.
Oden, Thompson, and Premack (1990), using the same four animals identified by D. Premack (1988),
found no evidence of conceptual-relational matching after extensive training of more than 1,000 trials per
animal.
Premack's conclusion regarding the efficacy of "dogged training," however, is seemingly supported by
results reported in an earlier study by Smith, King, Witt, and Rickel (1975). Those investigators presented
data suggesting that one of two language-naive chimpanzees matched conceptual relations that the
authors labeled as homogeneity (i.e., identity) and heterogeneity (i.e., nonidentity). However, the
experimental design and presentation of results preclude a definitive conclusion as to the actual
processes underlying the performance of this animal over the course of 5,000 trials (Thompson & Oden,
1996).
Let us grant that Smith et al. (1975) and D. Premack (1988) found evidence of conceptual relational
matching in language-naive chimpanzees after thousands of differentially reinforced trials. The contrast
between the effectiveness of their procedures and the virtually immediate success of language-trained
chimpanzees under conditions of nondifferential reinforcement serves to underscore the profound
contribution of some aspect of language training.
Two fundamental questions arise regarding the causal importance of D. Premack's language training
regimen for judgments of relational equivalence as described previously. First, in what way does

language training change a chimpanzee? Second, what aspects of the training are responsible for the
change?
We have reported evidence from infant chimpanzees pertinent to the first question (Oden et al., 1990).
Specifically, infant chimpanzees who matched objects on the basis of physical appearance nevertheless
could not match relations conceptually despite extensive training. However, the same four chimpanzees
demonstrated, via differential handling in a familiarization—novelty task, that they perceived similarities
and differences between exemplars of identity and nonidentity relationships despite their inability to judge
the equivalence of such relations in a conceptual matching task. Thus, these findings imply that
comprehension and production of functional symbolic sequences do not instill perceptual sensitivity to
abstract relations. This sensitivity exists before any such training. Language training, then, apparently
permits chimpanzees to express judgmentally what they otherwise only perceive.
Thompson and Oden (1993), discussing this disparity between perceptual and judgmental capacities,
suggested that conceptual matching might emerge in a chimpanzee if the animal were provided with any
concrete token that served as a representational tag for the relation. That is, provision of a token for
"same" enables an animal to match pairs of objects despite the absence of any physical resemblance
between them. According to this argument, the token or tag need not be imbedded within the context of a
larger linguistic string. It need only be a functional icon onto which an abstract relation could be mapped.
The implication then is that a string of elements is not necessary to represent certain prepositional
conditions such as the abstract relations of sameness and difference.
D. Premack independently came to a similar position on the basis of his experience with a group of four
captive-born chimpanzees studied from infancy to near puberty (D. Premack, 1988, 1992). In this latter
work, he used a language-training regimen consisting of: (a) lexicon and (b) "sentence" acquisition.
Introduction of plastic tokens representing the words same and different was the third step, which D.
Premack (1988) concluded was the critical step in language training. Furthermore, he argued that the
words same and different need refer during training to only physical similarity (e.g., "apple same apple").
This experience alone, D. Premack concluded, was sufficient for the chimpanzee to grasp that the
distinction was broadly construed, applying equally well to abstract relations as it did physical
resemblance. Nevertheless, he continued to speculate that the first two steps—lexicon and sentence
training—may be "indirect prerequisites" for enabling an animal to express relational knowledge (D.
Premack, 1988, p. 53). In this regard, his more recent stance was consistent with his earlier statements
that the critical aspect of language training is extensive experience with "a linguistic string and the
condition it describes" (D. Premack, 1984, p. 204) or in computing "the equivalence between a condition
and a discursive representation of the condition" (D. Premack, 1984, p. 204).
The present study is relevant to this issue of whether such experience is a necessary prerequisite for
conceptual-relational matching. Three of the animals, whose data are reported here, had not received the
previously described language training nor had they been tested on a conceptual-relational matching
task. These three chimpanzees, however, did have a history of conditional discrimination training using
tokens and multiple pairs of objects. That is, a single pair of physically identical items (e.g., AA) was a
discriminative stimulus for choosing an arbitrary heart-shaped token. Conversely, they had been
rewarded for choosing an arbitrary diagonally shaped token after presentations of single nonidentity
discriminative stimulus pairs (e.g., CD). The reflexive equivalence relation had not been trained or tested
(i.e., "If heart, then choose AA"). In addition, these animals also had a history of counting in which they
had been trained to associate Arabic numerals with corresponding numeric arrays (Boysen, 1993;
Boysen & Bernston, 1989).

As noted, Thompson and Oden (1993) proposed that prior provision of a concrete tag for an abstract
relation is sufficient for immediate conceptual-relational matching to occur in the absence of any explicit
training on that task. If so, then chimpanzees with a history of conditional discrimination training, as
described previously, should match conceptually on their first encounter with the problem. On the other
hand, if explicit relational judgments additionally require exposure to structured strings of tokens or
dogged training on a conceptual-relational matching task, then these same three animals should fail on
their initial encounter with that problem.
Method
General Design
The present study consisted of three matching-to-sample problem sets. Each set consisted of a block of
physical matching trials and a block of conceptual-relational matching trials. Identity and nonidentity pairs
were used as samples and alternatives in both the physical and conceptual matching problems. In Table
1, as elsewhere in this article, individual letters are used for expository purposes and refer to individual
objects or digitized images that served as stimuli. In physical matching problems, both the identity and
nonidentity samples consisted of pairs that were physically identical to the correct alternatives. For
example, both MM and NO appeared as samples and as alternatives on all physical matching trials in
Problem Set 1. In conceptual-relational matching problems, both the identity and nonidentity samples
consisted of pairs that differed physically from the alternatives. For example, in Problem Set 1, AA and EF
appeared as samples and BB and CD always appeared as the corresponding matching alternatives.
The first problem set was intended to determine whether the animals could match conceptually despite
their never having been trained on that particular relational problem. They were tested on conceptualrelational matching trials using nondifferential reinforcement in which all choices, both correct and
incorrect, were rewarded. Nondifferential reinforcement was used to determine whether conceptual
matching of relations between relations would occur spontaneously and to mitigate against rapid
acquisition of a learning set, which might occur when differential reward is used (cf. Nissen, Blum, &
Blum, 1948; Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988). The nondifferential reward procedure was used rather
than an extinction procedure because the latter disrupts performance by chimpanzees. Extrinsic rewards,
however, motivate a chimpanzee to continue a task independently of performance level (cf. Oden et al.,
1988; Oden & Thompson, 1992). The physical matching trial blocks were intended to provide a baseline
for matching abilities under optimum conditions of physical identity and differential reinforcement. Hence,
in contrast to conceptual-relational matching trials, correct physical matching responses were rewarded
and incorrect responses were not.
The second problem set involving novel stimuli was intended to ensure that any conceptual matching
performance demonstrated on the first problem set was not simply an artifact of the stimulus items used
in the first problem set. Again, differentially reinforced physical matching trials served as a baseline. The
third problem set was also intended as an additional test for conceptual-relational matching and further
served to evaluate the possible role of associative processes hi performance of this task. Novel pairs
were constructed using individual objects from the first two problem sets.
Recombining individual objects into novel alternatives for Problem Set 3 was intended to reveal whether
earlier performances in the conceptual matching trials were mediated by associative processes rather
than relational equivalence judgments. Decrements in performance would be expected in Problem Set 3 if
the chimpanzees based their choices on simpler associative strategies rather than conceptual matching
of relations between relations. On the other hand, no such decrement was predicted if performances were
conceptually mediated.

Table 1. Stimulus Pairs Used in Problem Sets 1 to 3
Conceptual-relational matching
Problem set
and pair

Identity

Physical matching
Nonidentity

Identity

Nonidentity

Problem Set 1
Sample

AA

Alternative

(BB)

RF
CD

BB

MM
(CD)

(MM)

NO
NO

MM

(NO)

Problem Set 2
Sample

GG

Alternative

(HH)

KL
IJ

HH

PP
(IJ)

(PP)

QR
QR

PP

MP

OO

(QR)

Problem Set 3
Sample
Alternative

GG
(CC)

AA
BH

(CC)

KL
BH

CC

EF
(BH)

CC

OO
(BH)

(OO)

MP
(MP)

Note. Pairs in parentheses indicate correct alternative choices. Individual letters within a pair refer to discrete objects (e.g., A = yellow talcum powder can and
B = green tin cup).

Animals
One juvenile and 4 adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were included in this study. One adult, Sarah,
had been trained previously on the symbolic language system developed by D. Premack (e.g., A. J.
Premack & Premack, 1972; D. Premack, 1976). She was one of the animals whose performance was
commonly cited as evidence for the disparity between language-trained and language-naive
chimpanzees. The 3 remaining adult chimpanzees—1 female (Sheba) and 2 males (Darrell and Kermit)—
included in the present study had a history of conditional discrimination training using tokens and multiple
object pairs as described previously (Boysen, 1993; Boysen & Bemston, 1989). A fifth juvenile male
animal, Bobby, had received neither language training nor the conditional discrimination task.
All of the animals lived in a group housing complex at the Comparative Cognition Project facility at Ohio
State University (e.g., see Boysen, 1992). They had access to both indoor and outdoor areas and had
been taught to "take turns" at entering an adjacent test room for experimental sessions. They were
neither food nor water deprived and could leave the testing session at any time by simply moving outside.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Because we were interested in immediate spontaneous matching, we deemed it best to use a procedure
of stimulus presentation that was familiar to the animals. Hence, object pairs serving as samples were
displayed on a narrow shelf on the experimenter's side of a Lexan window, which extended along one
wall of the testing room. Rewards (preferred candies) were dispensed via a plastic tube projecting
through the window. Digitized (i.e., PICT files) video images of the alternative choice pairs were
presented to the animal on a color computer monitor (NEC, Japan) in the test room at right angles to the
window. An IBM (Poughkeepsie, NY) microcomputer controlled presentation of the digitized choice stimuli
and recorded the animal's choices as detected by a Carroll (Round Rock, TX) touch-frame attached to the
monitor. Auditory feedback was also controlled by the computer. The procedure of using actual objects as
samples and digitized images as choice alternatives further provided a potential assay of object-picture
matching should the animals fail the conceptual matching task.

Stimulus pairs for both physical and conceptual-relational matching problems were constructed from
individual junk objects that differed in color, size, and shape. Sample pairs consisted of the objects
themselves mounted on a cardboard base (e.g., a yellow talcum powder can mounted side by side with a
physically identical talc can). Choice alternative pairs consisted of 76 × 76-mm digitized images of the
junk object pairs. These were presented on the monitor, separated, edge to edge, by 76 mm.
Six individual objects were used to construct the pairs presented in the initial conceptual problem set (see
Table 1). An additional three objects made up the pairs used in the physical matching trials. Nine novel
objects were used to construct the physical and conceptual samples and alternative pairs in Problem Set
2. The samples and alternatives for the physical matching trials in Problem Set 3 were constructed from
three familiar objects arranged in novel combinations (see Table 1). The samples in the conceptual
matching trials of Problem Set 3 were the same four pairs used in Problem Sets 1 and 2. The alternative
stimulus pairs in the conceptual matching trials consisted of novel pairings of objects used in alternative
pairs in Problem Sets 1 and 2 (see Table 1).
The individual objects were recombined in such a way as to reveal whether performances in the first two
conceptual matching problem sets were mediated by associative rather than conceptual-relational links
between samples and alternatives. First, objects in the novel identity alternatives of Problem Set 3 were
drawn from the nonidentity pairs used in Problem Sets 1 and 2. Conversely, objects in novel nonidentity
alternative pairs were drawn from previously used identity pairs. These rules were used for both
conceptual and physical matching trials in the third problem set. The rules for constructing conceptual
matching alternative pairs were further constrained as follows: For any particular sample in Problem Set
3, at least one member of the correct alternative had previously appeared within the incorrect alternative
associated with that specific sample in either Problem Set 1 or 2. These rules permitted us to probe for
the possible control of performances by stimulus specific associations.
For example, in Problem Set 1, Object A from sample pair AA might have become associated with Object
B of the correct BB alternative. Hence, in Problem Set 3, when AA was the sample, then B was one of the
objects in the incorrect BH alternative. Likewise, in Problem Set 1, either the C or the D object within the
nonidentity alternative might have become associated with either E or F of the corresponding nonidentity
sample. Hence, in Problem Set 3, if EF was the sample, then Object C was used in the incorrect CC
identity alternative. It is apparent then that any stimulus-specific associations acquired in Problem Sets 1
or 2 would encourage the chimpanzees to choose an incorrect alternative in Problem Set 3, resulting in
performance decrements.
These stimulus construction rules also allowed us to probe for conditional associations between sample
relations (i.e., identity or nonidentity) and a specific item within the correct alternative pairs. For example,
in Problem Set 1 a chimpanzee may have chosen correctly not by matching relations with relations but by
using an associative strategy of "If identity, choose B" and "If nonidentity, choose C." Hence, Objects B
and H, previously associated with identity samples AA and GG, respectively, were used in Problem Set 3
as the nonidentity alternative pair BH. Likewise, Object C, previously associated with the nonidentity
sample EF, was used to construct the CC identity alternative in Problem Set 3. If prior performances had
been controlled by conditional associations, then performance decrements would be expected in this third
problem set.
General Procedure
Each test session consisted of a block of 16 physical matching trials and a block of 16 conceptualrelational matching trials. Blocks of physical and conceptual matching trials were counterbalanced
between successive sessions in an ABBA design. Presentation order of the eight identity and eight

nonidentity trials was randomized within each block. The criterion for successful performance on each
problem set was 75% correct choices on both physical and conceptual matching trials on each of two
consecutive sessions. Once an animal met this criterion, it advanced to the next problem set.
In both physical and conceptual matching-to-sample, a trial began with the experimenter displaying the
sample pair to the subject through the observation window. The sample remained visible for the duration
of the trial. After the animal had looked at the sample, both alternative pairs were displayed
simultaneously on the monitor side by side. Spatial position of the alternatives was balanced over each
16-trial block. The animal indicated his or her choice by touching one of the alternative images on the
screen, and the computer automatically recorded the animal's choice.
Computer-generated feedback for correct responses on physical matching trials consisted of a highpitched tone (800 Hz) followed by a candy reward and an approximately 20-s intertrial interval (in).
Incorrect responses were followed by a low-pitched buzzer (300 Hz) and then the ITI. Nondifferential
feedback was used on all conceptual matching-to-sample trials. That is, both correct and incorrect
responses were accompanied by a middle-pitched beep (500 Hz) followed by a candy reward and then
the ITI.
Tests for inadvertent cueing of the correct stimulus pair image by the experimenter were run after the
completion of Problem Set 3. These included 16 "Clever Hans" conceptual matching trials during which a
second experimenter placed the sample pair on the shelf outside the test window and then immediately
stepped out of the testing room before the alternative choice pair images were presented on the touchscreen monitor. Experimenter 1 was seated behind a barrier out of sight of the animal and thus could not
see the samples or the animals' responses. Once the animals had made a response via the computer
touch-frame system, auditory feedback indicated that they had completed each trial, so that reinforcement
could then be provided. If earlier performances had been a function of inadvertent cueing by the
experimenter, then a decrement in performance might be expected. As indicated in the results reported
next, this did not occur. Interestingly, in a previous study, language-naive infant chimpanzees failed to
match relations between relations even when the experimenter explicitly pointed to the correct alternative
(Oden et al., 1990).
Results
Two animals, Darrell and Sheba, reached criterion on the original problem set in two sessions, each
consisting of one block of 16 physical matching trials and one block of 16 conceptual-relational matching
trials. Sarah reached criterion by the third session, and Kermit reached criterion after the fourth session of
16 conceptual-relational and 16 physical matching trials. The fifth animal, Bobby, failed to meet criterion
within four sessions. To confirm that criterion level performances were stable, an additional postcriterion
session was run for the 3 animals that met criterion in fewer than four sessions. Performance levels did
indeed remain stable, and results for the last two sessions completed by each animal are shown in Figure
1. Overall mean performance across the 4 animals that met criterion was 83.6% for physical matching
and 84.4% for conceptual-relational matching.
We cannot explain why 2 animals performed above chance immediately under nondifferential
reinforcement and the remaining subjects did not. The important point, however, is that they did reach
criterion levels of conceptual-relational matching performance in as few as 32 trials and in no more than
64 nondifferentially reinforced trials. This finding stands in sharp contrast to the earlier described reports
in which language-naive chimpanzees acquired conceptual-relational matching, if at all, only after
thousands of differentially reinforced trials (cf., Oden et al., 1990; D. Premack, 1988; Smith et al., 1975).

Figure 1. Percent correct physical (i.e., object) and conceptual (i.e., relations between relations) matching-tosample (MTS) judgments by chimpanzees on Problem Set 1. Judgments on physical MTS trials were
differentially rewarded, whereas judgments on conceptual MTS trials were not.

Figure 2. Percent correct physical (i.e., object) and conceptual (i.e., relations between relations) matching-tosample (MTS) judgments by chimpanzees on Problem Set 2. Judgments on physical MTS trials were
differentially rewarded, whereas judgments on conceptual MTS trials were not.

Figure 3. Percent correct physical (i.e., object) and conceptual (i.e., relations between relations) matching-tosample (MTS) judgments by chimpanzees on Problem Set 3. Judgments on physical MTS trials were
differentially rewarded, whereas judgments on conceptual MTS trials were not.

These data demonstrate that 4 of the 5 chimpanzees could physically and conceptually match pairs of
objects with the correct alternative pair presented as images on a monitor screen. The conceptual
matching of relations between relations occurred even in the absence of explicit instruction via differential
reward. In conceptual-relational matching trials, the correct alternative was an image of a pair of objects
that differed physically from the sample object pair but that instantiated the same relation (identity or
nonidentity) as the pair of objects making up the sample. In the case of physical matching trials, the
correct alternative pair was an image of the actual objects presented as the sample pair.
Both physical and conceptual matching performances continued without significant change in two novel
problem sets under the same conditions of differential reward in the physical matching condition and
nondifferential reward in the conceptual-relational matching condition. These data are shown in Figures 2
and 3. Overall mean physical matching performances across animals were 84.4% and 87.5% in Problem
Sets 2 and 3, respectively. The corresponding overall mean performances for conceptual matching in
Problem Sets 2 and 3 were 80.5% and 79.7%, respectively. Overall mean correct performances on these
two additional problems combined was 85.9% for physical matching and 80.1% for conceptual matching.
The overall mean correct performance on ihe Clever Hans conceptual matching trials conducted in
Problem Set 3 was 87.5%.
The data strongly suggest that these four chimpanzees spontaneously judged the conceptual equivalence
of relations between relations. A preliminary repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA; 2 × 3 × 2
× 2 ) with main factors of matching type (physical vs. conceptual), problem set (1, 2, and 3), session (1
and 2), and within-session trial block (1 and 2) revealed no differences between overall performances in

physical and conceptual-relational matching problem types, F (1, 3) = 2.26, p = .23. Hence, these animals
were as competent at matching relations between relations as they were at matching on the basis of
physical similarity. This equivalency of performance occurred despite the fact that the chimpanzees were
not differentially rewarded during conceptual-relational matching trials, whereas they were during physical
matching trials.
The ANOVA also permitted us to explore the possibility that performances on conceptual-relational
matching trials resulted from associative rather than conceptual processes. Specifically, an improvement
in performance across the two sessions for each problem might be expected if explicit associations
between stimulus elements were learned. This would be reflected in either a between-session main
effect, F(1, 3 = 9.00, p = -06, or a Session × Problem Type (physical vs. conceptual) interaction, F(1, 3) =
1.12, p = .37; neither of these were significant. Furthermore, if conceptual matching of relations was
influenced by a learning set phenomenon, then correct performances should further increase not only
across sessions but also between problems. This would be reflected as a significant main effect of
problem set number; this was not the case, F(2, 6) = 0.23, p = .80.
We looked also at performances across eight-trial blocks within each session. If performances were
mediated by stimulus associations, one might expect performance to improve across blocks. Although
there was a significant main effect for trial blocks, F(1, 3) = 14.49, p = .032, it reflected instead a
deterioration in performance from Block 1 to Block 2. Such a within-session performance decrement
might be expected if initial matching judgments were based on relative familiarity versus novelty of
stimulus pairs. There was, however, neither a Block X Session, F(1, 3) = 0.02, p = .90, nor a Block ×
Matching Problem Set, F(2, 6) = 1.02, p = .42, interaction. We conclude, therefore, that the decrement in
performance between trial blocks was not caused by relative familiarity-novelty judgments. The fact that
the block effect persisted across problems, regardless of matching problem type (conceptual vs.
physical), suggests that the performance decrements resulted from a generalized deterioration in
attention, reflecting increased fatigue or boredom with the task. This conclusion is supported by the
finding that the decrease in performance over the two eight-trial blocks, within sessions, occurred
independently of either physical or conceptual-relational matching judgments and, therefore,
independently of whether correct responses were differentially or nondifferentially rewarded.
Further Associative Analyses
These analyses argue against an associative interpretation of the data from conceptual-relational
matching trials. This conclusion was further reinforced by an analysis of conceptual matching errors in
Problem Set 3.
Object-specific associative valence. As previously noted, the sample pairs in Problem Set 3 had also
been used as samples in Problem Sets 1 and 2. Hence, Problem Sets 1 and 2 provided opportunities for
the chimpanzees to develop associations between single objects in the sample and the correct
alternative. For example, in Problem Set 1, Object A in the sample pair AA could have become positively
associated with Object B of the correct BB alternative. If this had been the case, then performances in
Problem Set 3 would have been adversely affected given our rules for constructing stimulus pairs.
In Problem Set 3, consider conceptual matching trials in which AA was the sample. Stimulus Item B,
contrary to Problem Set 1, was now a member of the incorrect BH alternative (see Table 1). The other
stimulus item, H, was associatively neutral with respect to the sample AA objects because Item H and
Object A had never appeared previously together in the same problem. Similarly, the correct CC
alternative consisted of Stimulus Item C, which was in the incorrect CD alternative associated with the AA

sample in Problem Set 1. Hence, Item C might have become negatively associated with Object A in
Problem Set 1.
Table 2. Association Valence Values of Objects in Problem Set 3
Trial

Identity

Sample pair

Nonidentity

GG

Alternative pairs

AA

KL

EF

(CC)

BH

(CC)

BH

CC

(BH)

CC

(BH)

oo

o+

-- --

+o

oo

o --

++

-- o

-- --

++

-- --

++

++

-- --

++

-- --

Valence of objects in Problem
a
Set 3 Alternatives
Object specific

b

Conditional associative

c

Note. Pairs in parentheses indicate correct alternative choices. Individual letters within a pair refer to discrete objects (e.g., A = yellow
talcum powder can and B = green tin cup.
a

Valence: Effect of prior associations (from Problem Sets 1 and 2) on probability of choice in current problem. "+" indicates instances in
which past associations bias a chimpanzee toward choice of the object. "—" indicates instances in which past associations bias a
chimpanzee against choosing that object (see text for details), "o" indicates instances in which there is no valence associated with an
object.

b

Effect of prior associations with objects in current sample.

c

Effect of prior status as an object in the correct or incorrect alternative, given sample relation (identity or nonidentity) in current problem.

In Problem Set 3 then, there was a historical positive associative valence between Sample Object A and
Object B of the incorrect BH alternative. One might predict that this positive associative valence would
bias an animal toward choosing the incorrect nonmatching pair. There was also a historical negative
associative valence between Sample Object A and both objects of the correct CC alternative pair. This
negative associative valence could bias an animal against choosing the correct stimulus pair. The
respective positive (+) and negative (-) associative valences between all specific sample and alternative
objects in Problem Set 3 are indicated in Table 2 under "object specific."
Conditional associative valences. Problem Set 3 allowed us also to probe for prior conditional
associations between the relation instantiated by samples (i.e., identity or nonidentity) and specific items
within the images of the alternative stimulus pairs. For example, in Problem Set 1 an animal may have
chosen correctly not by matching relations with relations but by using an associative strategy such as "If
identity, choose B" and "If nonidentity, choose C." Given our rules for constructing sample and alternative
stimulus pairs in Problem Set 3, such a strategy would have adversely affected conceptual matching
performances.
For example, in Problem Set 3, Objects B and H, which had previously been associated with AA and GG
identity samples, respectively, were now combined to form the nonidentity alternatives (see Table 1).
Likewise, Object C, which had been associated previously with the nonidentity EF sample, was now used
in conjunction with identity samples in Problem Set 3.
In Problem Set 3 then, there were historical positive and negative conditional associative valences
between sample relations of identity and nonidentity and individual items within the alternative stimulus
pairs. These valences respectively could bias the animals toward choosing the incorrect and against
choosing the correct alternatives. The respective conditional positive (+) and negative (-) associative
valences between sample relations and alternative object images in Problem Set 3 are indicated in Table
2 under "conditional associative."

The probability of conceptual matching errors was examined as a function of the total object-specific and
conditional associative valences inherent within each alternative pair as shown in Table 2. Positive (+)
valence biased animals toward choosing an incorrect nonmatching alternative, and negative (-) valence
biased animals against choosing the correct matching alternative. Neutral valences (0) were assumed to
be bias free.
The total conditional associative valence was equivalent in all trials of Problem Set 3. There were two
positive and two negative valences. As shown in Table 2, however, the total object-specific associative
valence was either one or three. In the former case, there was either one positive or one negative valence
value associated with the alternatives. In the latter case, the three valence values consisted of either two
positive valences and one negative valence or, alternatively, two negative valences and one positive
valence. Overall total valence values (five or seven) for each pair of stimulus alternatives were
determined by summing both the object-specific and conditional associative valences within each pair of
alternatives.
Interference in Problem Set 3 from a prior strategy of matching relations with specific objects in Problem
Sets 1 and 2 might be expected, particularly in those animals previously trained on the conditional samedifferent discrimination task described previously. Results from a chi-square analysis of error frequencies,
however, revealed no significant relationship between the specific or overall associative valence values
2
and sample type (χ = 2.35). Thus, this analysis revealed that the animals' performance on conceptualrelational matching trials in Problem Set 3 was not controlled by either object-specific or conditional
associative factors. Regardless of valence, the total number of errors on conceptual-relational matching
problems was low, and although the proportion of total errors that occurred on nonidentity trials was .57,
this value did not differ significantly from .50 (z = .71). Hence, the animals' error choices were not
systematically biased toward the choice of identity or nonidentity alternative pairs (cf. Oden et al., 1990,
Exp. 3).
Analysis of Trial 1 Performances
The evidence presented thus far points to the control of performances on conceptual matching by
judgments of relational equivalence. Correct performance on Trial 1 of a transfer problem is one of the
more compelling measures of generalized matching ability (e.g., Oden et al., 1988, 1990). The correct
Trial 1 performance across physical matching sessions for all problems was 83.3% overall (p < .01;
binomial test). The correct Trial 1 performance across conceptual-relational matching sessions for all
problems was, overall, 87.5% (p < .001; binomial test). Trial 1 data for individual animals over all sessions
within all three problems are shown in Table 3.
Physical matching sessions. Darrell and Sheba were correct on Trial 1 of each of the six physical
matching sessions in Problem Sets 1, 2, and 3. Kermit made a single physical matching error on Trial 1 of
the second session of Problem Set 2. Sarah committed three physical matching errors on Trial 1. She
made a Trial 1 error on Session 1 of Problem Set 1, Session 2 of Problem Set 2, and Session 1 of
Problem Set 3.
Conceptual matching sessions. Only Sarah was errorless on Trial 1 of each of the six conceptualrelational matching sessions in Problem Sets 1, 2, and 3. Darrell, Sheba, and Kermit each made a single
Trial 1 error in the three problem sets. Darrell was incorrect on Trial 1 of the first session of Problem Set
2. Sheba made an incorrect conceptual matching choice on Trial 1 of Session 2 in Problem Set 3. Kermit
made a Trial 1 conceptual matching error on Session 2 of Problem Set 1.

Table 3. Trial 1 Responses in Problem Sets 1 to 3
Conceptual problems

Physical problems

Darrell

Sheba

Sarah

Kermit

All
animals

Session 1

1

1

1

1

4

1

1

0

1

3

Session 2

1

1

1

0

3

1

1

1

1

4

Session 1

0

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

4

Session 2

1

1

1

1

4

1

1

0

0

2

Session 1

1

1

1

1

4

1

1

0

1

3

Session 2

1

0

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

4

5

5

6

5

21**

6

6

3

5

20*

Problem set and session
Problem Set 1

Darrell

Sheba

Sarah

Kermit

All
animals

Problem Set 2

Problem Set 3

All sessions
Note. 1 = correct choice; 0 = error.

*p < .01, binomial test. ** p < .001, binomial test.

The mean overall correct performance level for the three sessions that Darrell, Sheba, and Kermit began
with an incorrect conceptual-relational matching choice was 81.25% (p < .001, binomial test). In the
corresponding sessions in which they were correct on Trial 1, Darrell and Sheba's mean correct
conceptual-relational matching performances were both 82.5% (p < .001, binomial test). Kermit's
corresponding performance level was 85% (p < .001, binomial test). These Trial 1 performance data from
each session of all problem sets revealed that rewarding an incorrect choice on Trial 1 of a conceptualrelational matching problem had no measurable influence on subsequent performance. As noted, overall
conceptual matching accuracy on Trial 1 for all problem sets was well above chance and, hence, further
evidence that these chimpanzees approached the problems with a conceptual response strategy of
matching relations between relations that generalized across matching exemplars.
Discussion
Conceptual Matching Without Language Training
Four of 5 chimpanzees conceptually matched relations between relations in three problem sets at well
above chance levels in the absence of any explicit training via differential feedback on each trial.
Furthermore, they performed correctly at levels that were statistically indistinguishable from their physical
matching performances in the problem sets under conditions of differential reward.
Three of the animals spontaneously matched relations between relations despite their never having
received any training in the language system experienced years ago by Sarah, a fourth chimpanzee who
also had a history of conceptual problem solving. The fifth chimpanzee, Bobby, a juvenile male, failed to
achieve criterion not only on conceptual but also on physical matching trials. This animal was naive with
respect to language training, numeric problem solving, and the conditional discrimination task
experienced by the other animals. Bobby also had not had explicit training on object—image recognition.
The remainder of this discussion addresses several issues. First, we discuss the question of whether the
conceptual-relational matching problems were solved using associative processes. Second, we consider
two hypotheses presented as challenges to D. Premack's original assertions as to the necessary

importance of language training for acquisition of a broadly construed conceptual matching ability. One
hypothesis is that conceptual-relational matching can emerge from nothing more than a rich and varied
history of training and testing (Roitblat, 1985). A second hypothesis is that conceptual matching of
relations between relations is simply a procedural skill resulting from extensive experience with differential
reinforcement. We argue that neither of these hypotheses can account for the results of the present
study. Finally, we discuss what we consider to be the necessary conditions responsible for the
spontaneous expression of conceptually driven abstract relational equivalence judgments.
Inadequacies of Associative Interpretations
There is good evidence that many species can solve problems involving equivalence judgments using
strategies other than a conceptual judgment that an item or relation (e.g., identity or nonidentity) is the
same as another (D. Premack, 1983a; Thompson, 1995). One such process might be stimulus-specific
associations between individual objects making up the samples and alternatives. That is, an animal's
performance may be based either wholly or in part on the simple associative rule "If A then B" and "If E
then C." For example, the procedure used by Smith et al. (1975) of differentially rewarding correct
matches and not rewarding mismatches left open the possibility of their chimpanzees learning their tasks
in this manner.
An animal's dependence on such stimulus-specific attributes in a matching task may be revealed when it
fails to transfer its performance to novel items (e.g., Oden et al., 1990). Typically, in cases in which
differential reward is used, correct performance on Trial 1 with any given stimulus set is a primary criterion
for inferring a conceptual basis to performance. No such data were reported by Smith et al. (1975), whose
only reported control was for position effects of a correct alternative for a given sample.
Another possible process is a conditional response rule, as discussed previously, in which the choice of a
particular alternative was determined by the relationship instantiated by the sample. That is, an animal's
performance in Problem Set 1 may have been based in part on the rule "If identity sample, then choose
Item B" and "If nonidentity sample, then choose Item C."
In the case of our animals that matched relations between relations, there was no evidence of associative
influences on performances in the three problem sets. This conclusion is based on three lines of
evidence. First, performance levels did not improve across either of the two sessions within each problem
set or across the three problem sets. Although there was a significant performance decrement within
each 16-trial session, it was attributable to motivational or attentional factors rather than a reflection of
associative processes. This conclusion was based on the fact that the decrement was observed during
both physical and conceptual relational matching sessions. Hence, the decrement occurred
independently of whether or not responses were differentially reinforced. Furthermore, the magnitude of
the decrements was consistent throughout the study.
The second line of evidence against interpreting the chimpanzees' performances within an associative
framework is found in the results from Problem Set 3. Alternative pairs in Problem Set 3 were constructed
such that the associative histories of each within-pair element would lead to performance decrements if
past performances were based on either simple or complex associative rather than conceptual
judgments. No such decrements were observed, indicating that the animals were matching relations
between relations conceptually.
Finally, the third line of evidence against an associative interpretation of the conceptual-relational
matching results is provided by an examination of matching performances on Trial 1 of each session
within each problem. The results revealed that correct Trial 1 matches were significantly above chance

and, furthermore, correct performances on subsequent trials did not vary systematically with whether or
not a correct or incorrect choice was made on Trial 1.
Overall, then, there is nothing to suggest that conceptual-relational matching by these 4 animals was
mediated by associative processes. When these chimpanzees matched relations, they were, in essence,
indicating that they judged "the relation exemplified by this (alternative) image-pair is the same as that
exemplified by the sample object-pair." What we do not know is the specific relational dimension within
pairs (e.g., AA and CD) that they were using to denote sameness between pairs. It could have been, for
example, the relational dimension denoted by the experimenters (i.e., one of reflexive identity [A is A] vs.
nonidentity [C is not D]). Alternatively, the within-pair stimulus dimension might have been one of
symmetry (A maps onto A) versus asymmetry (C does not map onto D). Regardless of the functional
within-pair relational dimension, the resulting matching judgment of relational equivalence between
relations (AA = BB; CD = EF) could not be based on physical dimensions of color, shape, or size.
Is Language Training a Necessary Condition for Conceptual Matching?
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for conceptual matching of relations between relations?
D. Premack's early discussions (1983a, 1983b, 1984) emphasized the facilitative effect of language
training per se. In this section, we discuss two alternative hypotheses, namely test sophistication and
persistent or dogged training with differential reinforcement.
Test sophistication hypothesis. Some critics of D. Premack's early position (e.g., Roitblat, 1985) proposed
that an overall rich and varied history of problem solving in general, rather than language training per se,
enabled Premack's chimpanzees to solve conceptual matching and related analogical problems. The
argument here is that exposing animals to a variety of different problem types creates a test-sophisticated
animal better prepared to engage novel situations and problems with a range of hypotheses at various
levels of stimulus complexity (i.e., from concrete physical to conceptual and abstract).
A similar argument could be made concerning the successful conceptual matching of relations between
relations by the 3 language-naive animals in the present study. That is, prior training on the conditional
discrimination task involving concrete tokens and relations may not have been critical. Rather, this
training may simply have been one experience among many that collectively, and through some
unspecified process, enhanced conceptual relational competence. The appeal of the test sophistication
argument is weakened, however, by D. Premack's reports (1976, 1983a, 1983b) of test-sophisticated but
language-naive animals that failed to match relations between relations and to perform related analogical
problem-solving tasks.
To our knowledge, the definitive empirical test for the causal effect of token training per se, independently
of language training, has not been conducted. Such a test would entail two groups of experimentally
naive chimps, one of which is made test sophisticated via exposure to a rich variety of problem-solving
tasks—including those involving relations and analogical reasoning—and another group given token
training alone. Subsequently, both groups would be tested under conditions of nondifferential
reinforcement on a conceptual-relational matching task. If, as suggested by Thompson and Oden (1993),
token training alone is necessary for the emergence of conceptual problem solving, then the latter group
of chimpanzees, but not the former, should pass the test.
Dogged-training hypothesis. As noted early in this article, D. Premack (1988) briefly mentioned one study
that suggested that conceptual matching can be achieved by training of a "nonlinguistic" character. In this
report, he referred to the effects of persistent dogged training on a problem in which chimpanzees were
required to match like proportions of different objects (e.g., to match ½ apple to ½ container of liquid).

Those results, however, differ fundamentally from those of the present study and from the previously
reported effects of language training. The performance of the animals hi the proportional matching task
did not transfer to novel problems involving other forms of relational judgments like, presumably,
conceptual-relational matching to sample (D. Premack, 1988). This was not the case for Premack's
language-trained animals that did generalize their relational problem-solving skills across several different
nonlinguistic domains, including conceptual-relational matching (cf. D. Premack, 1983a, 1983b, 1984).
Likewise, the chimpanzees in the present study spontaneously solved a novel problem involving relational
judgments. Nowhere in their training history had they been explicitly trained or tested on a conceptual
task involving the matching of relations between relations. Their prior experience, however, did entail the
matching of identity and nonidentity stimulus pairs with concrete tokens. The functional role of concrete
tokens as symbols for relational information was likely further reinforced by their additional experience
matching Arabic numerals to arrays of objects (Boysen, 1993; Boysen & Bernston, 1989).
Necessary and Sufficient Prior Conditions
We conclude that the test sophistication and dogged training hypotheses are insufficient to account for
the evidence of spontaneous conceptual-relational matching demonstrated in this study and elsewhere.
We turn now to consider other alternatives as to what might be the necessary and sufficient prior
conditions.
Experience with discursive strings of symbols. One interpretation championed by D. Premack in his
earlier writings focuses on experience judging the equivalence between a string of potentially linguistic
elements and the propositional conditions that they represent (D. Premack, 1983a, 1983b, 1984,1986).
The second approach is to focus on the functional role of concrete tags or labels for same-different
relations (Thompson & Oden, 1993). Despite his more recent emphasis on the functional role of "words"
or tokens per se, D. Premack continues to entertain the possibility that experience with other aspects of
language training (e.g., lexicon and sentences) "may be an indirect prerequisite" (Premack, 1988, p. 53)
for analogical reasoning about relations between relations.
The present data indicate that experience with linguistic discursive strings of tokens is not necessary for
problem solving involving judgments about the equivalence of relations in a matching task. As previously
noted, 3 of the chimpanzees that matched relations between relations in the present study had not
experienced explicit training involving the use of discursive strings of tokens. They were experienced, as
noted, with labeling numeric displays of objects with Arabic numerals (e.g., 3 is XXX and XXX is 3) and
with labeling pairs of objects as being either the same or different (i.e., "If identity, choose heart" and "If
nonidentity, choose diagonal"). The remaining critical issue, then, is whether this prior experience with the
labeling of referents and relations with tokens (cf. Danto, 1983, D. Premack, 1983b) was the critical
causal factor underlying the spontaneous emergence of conceptual-relational matching capabilities.
Experience with token training. Both D. Premack (1988) and Thompson and Oden (1993) suggested that
the facultative effects of token training or labeling might result from a broadly construed attentional shift in
the processing hierarchy an animal brings to bear in problem-solving situations. The natural
predisposition to attend to physical sensory features on which computational processes are applied
presumably is displaced by a tendency to process abstract relational aspects of stimulus arrays that are
perceived directly (Oden et al., 1990).
We suspect that such an attentional shift was achieved in D. Premack's experiment (1988) involving the
persistent dogged training of chimpanzees on a proportions matching task. As noted previously, however,
the effect of this training was specific to the proportions problem. In contrast, the token-training

experiences of the chimpanzees in the present study were much more broadly effective. Apparently, they
enabled the chimpanzees to subsequently match relations between relations spontaneously in the
absence of any explicit token or symbol.
Hence, although persistent training over thousands of differentially reinforced trials may facilitate an
attentional shift, the effect is not broadly construed. It constrains success to the specific type of problem
encountered in the original training. Prior experience with arbitrary tokens that are potentially labels for
referent items or relations, however, is not similarly constrained; its effect is broadly construed.
Apparently, then, some kinds of nonlinguistic experiences "upgrade a mind" (D. Premack & Premack,
1983) in ways that other kinds do not. The performance of the present animals is unequivocally matched
only by those animals in D. Premack's laboratories that had enjoyed the benefits of language training.
The common experiential denominator shared by his language-sophisticated animals and the languagenaive animals in the present study is experience with tokens. However, why should training with tokens
such as symbols for "same and different" or numeric displays cause an animal not only to shift its
attention to prepositional (relational) levels of processing but also to generalize this attentional shift to
novel situations and problem types in a way not observed with other procedures? (See also Herman,
Hovancik, Gory, & Bradshaw, 1989; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993.)
Functional Role of Tokens
Thompson and Oden (1993) proposed that any training history involving the functional correspondence
between an arbitrary cue or token and an abstract relation is sufficient to enable a chimpanzee to match
relations between relations. They based their hypothesis on the suggestion that a critical function of the
token is to provide an animal with a concrete icon for encoding an otherwise abstract prepositional
representation. That is, the token or tag has the retrieval function of a word (cf. D. Premack, 1990, p. 209;
D. Premack & Premack, 1994, p. 98). An English-speaking human seeing or hearing the word rabbit
retrieves the properties of that animal that can be represented iconically or discursively by other words.
However, the functional relationship between words and the information they retrieve is reciprocal or
reflexive. Hence, if one now hears or sees the referent, one can retrieve the word, or even a discursive
string of words, describing that object, event, or relationship (e.g., "See 'XXX', 'think three'"). That is, the
token or tag "objectifies" a relationship (Kluver, 1933/1961) per se independently of any particular
exemplar. In this sense, then, tokens are analogous to words. They serve as concrete symbols or icons
that anchor propositional knowledge.
Conceptual-relational matching as covert symbol matching. According to the taxonomic model of
matching proposed by Thompson and Oden (1996), these symbolic tokens provide the necessary iconic
representational basis on which the multiple encoding and computational steps mandated by the
conceptual-relational matching procedure can occur. Hence, in the present study, one can hypothesize
the following sequence of computational and representation events.
First, the chimpanzee detects the within-pair relation instantiated, for example, by an AA (identity) or a CD
(nonidentity) sample. This evokes an internal iconic representation of the concrete token (e.g., "heart" or
"diagonal") that symbolically codes identity and nonidentity, as learned previously in an unrelated task.
Likewise, these icons symbolizing the relations identity and nonidentity, respectively, will be evoked when
the chimpanzee next detects the within-pair relations instantiated by the BB and EF alternatives
presented on the computer monitor.
The chimpanzee can now covertly match these representational icons (e.g., heart and diagonal) against
the symbolic representation of heart or diagonal evoked by the sample. Thompson and Oden (1996)

hypothesized that it is only at this point in the sequence of computational and encoding processes that an
animal is in the position to judge one relation as being the same as another relation (cf. Table 1 in
Thompson & Oden, 1996).
Conceptual-relational matching is made possible by the chimpanzee's representational capacity to reencode abstract relations, which are instantiated by physically disparate sample and alternative pairs, into
iconically identical symbols. It follows from this analysis that prior token training reduces conceptualrelational matching to a task that is functionally equivalent to physical matching. Both types of
equivalence judgment (i.e., one object to another and one relation to another) become the product of
covert concrete icon matching.
Conclusion. In short, we believe experience with symbolic tokens per se produces a system for universal
computation in the chimpanzee, as it does also for the human child, if not other species. The present
results, taken in the context of previous studies with language-naive chimpanzees (e.g., Oden et al.,
1990), also support the theoretical assumption that symbols are "in the world" first and only later "in the
head" (Hutchins, 1995). Furthermore, the chimpanzee's "upgraded mind," like that of a child, is the
product of a historical process involving the external organization of symbolic experiences by other beings
and, in the chimpanzee's case, another species (D. Premack, 1988, 1990; Rumbaugh & SavageRumbaugh, 1992).
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